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During the last years, interconnectivity and merging the physical and digital technological dimensions 
have become a topic attracting the interest of the modern world. Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly 
evolving as it manages to transform physical devices into communicating agents which can 
consecutively create complete interconnected systems. A sub-category of the IoT technology is smart 
toys, which are devices with networking capabilities, created for and used in play. Smart toys’ 
targeting group is usually children and they attempt to provide a higher level of entertainment and 
education by offering an enhanced and more interactive experience. 
 
Due to the nature and technical limitations of IoT devices, security experts have expressed concerns 
over the effectiveness and security level of smart devices. The importance of securing IoT devices 
has an increased weight when it pertains to smart toys, since sensitive information of children and 
teenagers can potentially be compromised. Furthermore, various security analyses on smart toys have 
discovered a worryingly high number of important security flaws. 
 
The master thesis focuses on the topic of smart toys’ security by first presenting and analyzing the 
necessary literature background. Furthermore, it presents a case study where a smart toy is selected 
and analyzed statically and dynamically utilizing a Raspberry Pi. The aim of this thesis is to examine 
and apply methods of analysis used in the relevant literature, in order to identify security flaws in the 
examined smart toy. The smart toy is a fitness band whose target consumers involve children and 
teenagers. The fitness band is communicating through Bluetooth with a mobile device and is 
accompanied by a mobile application. The mobile application has been installed and tested on an 
Android device. 
 
Finally, the analyses as well as their emerged results are presented and described in detail. Several 
security risks have been identified indicating that developers must increase their efforts in ensuring 
the optimal level of security in smart toys. Furthermore, several solutions that could minimize security 
risks and are related to our findings are suggested, along with potentially interesting topics for future 
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One of the main factors that contribute to the development of a child is the act of playing. Play is 
critical to the social, physical and emotional stability and well-being of children as it helps them 
unfold their creativity and cooperate with one another. Therefore, play is a mechanism for children 
to have fun and develop several skills necessary for them later in life [1]. 
Toys have been one of the main tools which initiate play among children and have been in 
existence from ancient civilization to the modern era. Starting from being merely sticks and rocks, 
toys have evolved into dolls and finally into modern toys that utilize current technological trends. 
One of those being the Internet of things, IoT technologies have seen rapid advancement and usage 
during the last years. One of the sub-fields of IoT are smart toys which I am defining as essentially 
toys with networking capabilities, that can provide a far more enhanced and immersive experience 
to children. 
As with every rapidly advancing technology, security experts have expressed certain concerns 
related to the level of security in IoT devices. Enhancing security in IoT is a challenging task 
because of certain characteristics of IoT such as their physical limitations in available resources. 
However, it is highly important to ensure an adequate level of security in smart devices, a need of 
even greater importance when considering smart toys which can potentially mishandle children’s 
sensitive data. Smart toys have specific capabilities such as network features in order to 
communicate with for example the mobile application, therefore increasing its attack surface [2]. 
However, despite the importance of enforcing smart toys’ security, developers have to keep taking 
steps in the right direction and prioritize this even more. There are several cases where large smart 
toy manufacturers have made serious mistakes which led to data breaches. Some examples are 
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VTech’s database breach where multiple accounts have been compromised, as well as the Hello 
Kitty breach [3]. Researchers have analyzed relevant smart toys and their findings are a raising 
concern amongst security experts; several critical flaws and vulnerabilities potentially indicate that 
developers do not pay the necessary attention to the device’s security level [4]. 
This master’s thesis aims to investigate and identify smart toys’ security flaws, using as a basis 
already conducted research papers and specifically verify the methods used by Gordon Chu et al 
[4]. This is achieved by performing a static and dynamic analysis on a randomly selected smart 
toy and analyzing security issues that have been discovered during both parts of the analysis. In 
addition, all the methods used are described in detail from the starting point of setting up the 
necessary components and software used, to the methods used for identifying flaws of the mobile 
application accompanying the smart toy. The smart toy is a fitness band whose target consumers 
involve children and teenagers, and is accompanied by a relevant mobile application. 
The outline of the thesis structure is described below: 
 
In the first chapter the reader is introduced to the idea behind the writing of the thesis as well as 
the general outline of its structure. In the second chapter the main focus is defining and describing 
the fundamental concepts upon which the thesis is based upon. The reader is introduced to the 
topic of IoT, the general categories which consist the aforementioned technology as well as shortly 
defining the main areas it is applied on. The second main point is cybersecurity in general and the 
connection between security and IoT technology. 
The third chapter introduces the reader to an even more specific topic of IoT, which is defining 
and analyzing security in relation with smart toys. In this chapter the reader gets accustomed with 
several methods of attacks performed on smart toys as well as the major discovered security flaws 
and risks. 
The fourth chapter describes the case study of an analysis, both static and dynamic, performed in 
a randomly selected smart device. Firstly, the idea behind the chosen methods is described as well 
as the necessary steps in order to set up the environment necessary for performing the analysis. 
Moreover, the chapter consists of two main sections. The first section focuses on the statistic 
analysis, where all the findings are described in detail. The second section of this chapter focuses 
on the dynamic analysis as well as the steps taken in order to discover relevant security flaws. 
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The fifth chapter discusses the findings of the analysis and attempts to evaluate as well as to 
suggest alternative approaches and solutions to the discovered security flaws. Lastly, the sixth and 















2 IoT overview 
 
The Internet of Things or Internet of Everything is an idea that began taking shape, way before the 
actual use of the term [5]. Initially the idea of connecting several devices together with the goal 
of providing a way of interconnected communication was implemented by students at the Carnegie 
Melon University where a vending machine was Internet-connected with the help of photosensors 
[5]. As such anyone who had access to the Internet could determine the number of remaining 
drinks as well as their state (e.g., if they are cold or not). Almost a decade later the same 
principle of connecting devices through the Internet was applied to an internet-connected toaster; 
using TCP/IP and with the help of controller in order to turn it off or on [5]. 
 
2.1 Defining the IoT 
 
In the modern era Internet of Things is identified as one of the most important and prominent areas 
in technology where an increasing number of industries has taken an interest in. Enterprises can 
take a significant advantage when utilizing the IoT technology as it can heavily impact customer 
support, inventory management as well as business analytics [6]. Supply demands can change 
rapidly and IoT can greatly help by increasing the speed of the response to those demands. 
Consecutively, the production as well as the function of the supply networks is optimized, as 
components of those areas, among others, are connected and communicating with one another. 
As competition among technological firms intensifies, the need to adopt new technologies and 
utilize the advantages of it become more intense. This pressure reflects to IoT as this technology 
has seen a rapid increase in its popularity among firms and is expected to continue doing so. The 
estimations and the numbers given agree with the abovementioned claim; one example is the 
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prognostic by Gartner made in 2014 where it is expected that the number of IoT devices will 
increase to 26 billion devices by 2020 whereas in 2009 the number was merely 0.9 billion. 
Five of the more widely used IoT technologies are Radio frequency identification (RFID), 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN), Middleware, Cloud Computing and IoT application software. 
 
 
2.1.1 Radio frequency identification (RFID) 
 
Radio Frequency Identification is one the main technological achievements related to embedded 
computing that utilizes microchips in order to exchange data wirelessly [7]. Three basic 
components are used in order to achieve data transmission; radio waves, a tag that can store a 
bigger amount of data compared to barcodes as well as a reader [6]. When the RFID receiver 
triggers an electromagnetic request, the tag transmits data in order to identify itself. There are three 
main tag categories; Passive RFID tags where the tag does not have its own power supply but 
instead draws power from the tag reader. This category of tags is prominent in supply chain 
management as well as access control applications. Currently many road-toll tags as well as bank 
cards utilize passive tags. The second category is Active RFID tags where the RFID tag has its 
own battery supply. This feature allows for greater distance between the tag and the reader in order 
to communicate data. The final category is the Semi-passive tags where the tag utilizes batteries 
for powering, similar to active ones, while drawing power from the reader when communicating. 
Generally active and semi-passive tags have a greater cost than passive ones [6]. 
 
 
2.1.2 Wireless sensor networks (WSN) 
 
Wireless sensor networks refer to spatially distributed sensors that can be attached to devices in 
order to measure conditions like temperature, sound levels, wind levels etc. The network consists 
of several nodes that form a network transmitting data throughout them and finally through the 
gateway sensor node which is the endpoint between network and the end user. The user then can 
measure and monitor the available data as well as configure the network. Typical examples of 







Middleware is a software component that acts as the glue between software application layers 
making communication and interchanging data between them easier. It acts as a mask hiding the 
way inputs are handled (those technologies and methods of handling data that would be irrelevant 
to the IoT developers). In IoT, where a plethora of different devices with unique characteristics are 




2.1.4 Cloud Computing 
 
Cloud Computing enables easy and suitable on-demand access to computing resources such as 
networks, servers and applications while having a fast reaction to provisioning and releasing 
requests with minimal management effort. There are five essential elements relevant to cloud 
computing [8]: 
• On-demand self-service: a party can benefit and utilize resources without the need of an 
external human provider related to those resources. 
• Resource pooling: resources are pooled in order to serve multiple different consumers. The 
purpose of pooling is to mask the resources to the consuming parties (e.g., a consumer is 
not aware as to where their data is stored in the cloud). 
• Broad network access: The resources are distributed over a network and are utilized by a 
plethora of different devices. 
• Rapid elasticity: Provision of resources needs to be adaptable to the needs of the consumers 
as they can increase, as well as be able to instantly be release when they are no longer 
needed. Resources need to also appear infinite to the consumers are their needs can increase 
rapidly and is mandatory that those are met. 
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• Measured Service: As resources are pooled and shared between several consuming parties, 
the cloud model has to be able to monitor and track the number of resources utilized by 
each of those parties [8]. 
 
 
2.1.5 IoT application software 
 
IoT applications provide the means of communication and interchanging data between devices as 
well as human and devices. Communications between different parties (either referring to device- 
device interaction or human – device interaction) have to established in a robust, steady and 
reliable manner. Thus, message have to be transmitted in a timely punctual manner in order for 
relevant actions to be immediately taken. An example can be the transportation industry where 
monitoring factors such as temperature, humidity etc. plays an important role on what actions have 
to be taken in case of a change in their values. Communications between devices usually do not 
require visualization of data and information. In systems where the human factor is present 
visualization of data is extremely useful in order to provide to the users a way of presenting data 
in an understandable way. Finally, IoT applications have to be built in a way that monitoring, 
interchange of data and resolution of issues that may arise does not need any sort of human 
intervention. 
The Internet of Things technology has a big impact and plays a vital role in several different areas 
(domains) from healthcare to transportation or even in personal domains such as smart homes and 
devices. The table below presents the plethora of different domains that utilize the IoT technology 
as well as the way it is applied. 
 
 
Table 1. Domains utilizing IoT and relevant applications ([5]) 
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Aerospace and aviation; 
automotive; Telecommunications; 
medical and healthcare; 
independent living; 
pharmaceutical; retail, logistics 
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Tutorials 17 (4): 
2347–2376. 
Industrial; social IoT; healthcare; 
infrastructure; security and surveillance 
Smart home; smart building; 
intelligent 
transportation system; industrial 
automation; 
smart healthcare; smart grids 
Zanella et al. 
(2014). 
“Internet 
of Things for 
Smart Cities.” 
IEEE Internet of 
Things Journal 1 
(1): 22–32. 
Smart city Structural health of buildings; 
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quality; noise 
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consumption; smart lighting; 
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maps; smartphones detection; 
electromagnetic 

















































waste management; smart roads 
 
Forest fire detection; air pollution; 
snow level 
monitoring; landslide and 
avalanche 
prevention; earthquake early 
detection; 
 
Portable water monitoring; 
chemical leakage 
detection in rivers; swimming 
pool remote 
measurement; pollution levels in 
the sea; water 
leakages; river floods 
 
Smart grid; tank level; 
photovoltaic installations; 
water flow; silos stock 
calculations 
 
Perimeter access control; liquid 
presence; 
radiations levels; explosives and 
hazardous gases 
 
Supply chain control; NFC 
payment; intelligent 




Quality of shipment conditions; 
item locations; 
storage incompatibility detections; 
fleet tracking 
 
M2M Applications; indoor air 
quality; temperature 








  courses; meteorological station 
network; 
compost; hydroponics 
Smart animal farming Offspring care; animal tracking; 
toxic gas levels 
Domestic and home automation Energy and water use; remote 
control appliances; 
intrusion detections systems; art 
and goods 
Preservation 
eHealth Fail detections; medical fridges; 
sportsmen care; 
patients; surveillance; ultraviolet 
radiations 
Miorandi et al. Smart homes/smart buildings; smart cities; - 
(2012). environment monitoring; healthcare; smart  
“Internet of business/inventory and product  
Things: Vision, management; security and surveillance  
Applications and   
Research   
Challenges.” Ad   
Hoc Networks   
10 (7): 1497–   
1516.   
aPaper focuses on IoT in Industries. 
 







Dan Craigen, Nadia Diakun-Thibault, and Randy Purse define cybersecurity as follows: 
 
“Cybersecurity is the organization and collection of resources, processes, and structures used to 
protect cyberspace and cyberspace-enabled systems from occurrences that misalign de jure from 
de facto property rights” [9]. 
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Generally, cybersecurity refers to the protection and prevention of computer systems and networks 
as well as the individual parts or assets that compose them from damage and disruption. Cyber- 
attacks can cause disruption or even misdirection of services, forcing them to behave in an 
unintended way in order to achieve individual goals of the attacking party. Assets refer to a 
plethora of elements such as human resources (personnel of a company), electronic devices, 
software and services, and every data and information interchanged inside the relevant 
environment [10]. 
Cybersecurity can be broken down into three individual parts whose presence is necessary for its 
definition. The first part are threats, which refer to any action that is taken in order to take 
advantage and maliciously exploit a weak point of the attacked system. Threats generally stem 
from either natural or human sources. In the context of cybersecurity, we are referring to those 
caused by human intervention [11]. The second part is vulnerabilities of the attacked system which 
refer to any weakness of the system that can be exploited by a malicious actor in order to disrupt 
or damage the system. Finally, the third part that constitutes the definition of cybersecurity is the 
assets that need to be protected. 
 
 
Figure 1: The concept of cybersecurity [10] 
 
 
2.3 Security in the Internet of Things 
 
As IoT technology is becoming increasingly prominent in the modern world, the need to protect 
and secure the relevant systems increases as well. IoT comes with certain limitations which can 
make this challenging to achieve. Some of the security challenges described by Carsten Maple [5] 
are: 
 
1. Existing physical limitations of IoT devices 
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One of the most critical challenges when discussing IoT technology is the physical limitations of 
the relevant devices comprising the IoT system. The majority of the IoT devices are designed based 
on a main axis of relatively low cost and size dimensions. This results in a low amount of resources 
and computing capability. Furthermore, many devices deployed in the military, industrial and 
agriculture need to function for long periods of time without recharging them [12]. Three of the 
most important obstacles in securing the system is the limited battery supply as well as the physical 
specifications and resources or computing capability of the devices, particularly when it comes to 
memory capacity. 
The problem of the limited battery power can be approached by three possible solutions that each 
of them presents relevant challenges. Firstly, the most obvious one would be to increase the battery 
capacity; this approach presents the problem of IoT devices’ inherent size constrictions as the 
devices themselves need to be small in size in relatively lightweight. A second possible solution 
would be to decrease the security requirements, something that would present several risks 
especially when dealing with sensitive data and information. Finally, battery could be recharged 
using natural resources, a solution that could significantly increase the cost [13]. 
Due to the mentioned limitations IoT devices lack specific features such as memory management 
unit [MMU] thus are not able to take advantage of memory isolation, address space layout 
randomization and other features related to memory handling [12]. As the specification of IoT 
devices are limited e.g., limited memory and CPU, the use of advanced cryptographic algorithms 
is hard to achieve [14]. This can result to malicious parties being able to take advantage of memory 
vulnerabilities. Additionally, because of the physical limitations, IoT devices do not use encryption 
or in some occasions do not check the server’s certificate when communicating, thus being 
susceptible to e.g., man-in-the-middle attacks. 
Several solutions have been proposed by researches in order to address the physical limitations of 
IoT devices. One proposed solution, ARMor [15] is a system that utilizes software fault isolation 
that can protect code running on small embedded processors, but in some applications, which 
checked frequently addresses it caused high performance overhead. Another proposed solution for 
this challenge by Shafagh et al. [16] is an encrypted query processing algorithm that utilizes cloud 
in order to securely store encrypted IoT information, something that improves processing of 
queries made to the database in order to manipulate encrypted data. Another proposed approach 
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by Kotamsetty and Govindarasu [17] aims on reducing the latency when processing queries over 
encrypted data, by reducing the amount of resulted data in smaller sets of data. A common 
approach or cryptography researchers is to design lightweight cryptography algorithms that use 
less resources than preexisting ones. However, it is very difficult that lightweight algorithms can 
provide the same level of security with classical ones. 
 
 
2. Diverseness of devices and ad hoc nature 
 
As the IoT concept is utilized in an increasing rate, the technologies and services involved are 
becoming more diverse with the common goal of collaborating with one another in order to create 
a robust system. IoT devices are deployed in a plethora of domains and as such need to perform a 
variety of tasks based on the needs of the domain’s environment. Therefore, the capabilities and 
physical requirements of the devices vary vastly in each case. For example, the small temperature 
sensor in a smart home greatly differs from a military or industrial automatic machine. 
Additionally, the communication protocols are different depending on the scenario based on which 
IoT devices are deployed. Different authentication and communication protocols can exist even in 
the same IoT system (Amazon’s AWS IoT and Alibaba’s Alink) [12]. New protocols can have a 
variety of plausible security vulnerabilities. As manufacturers usually utilize a variety of third- 
party SDKs the workflow of the system can be complicated and if not carefully assessed can lead 
to privacy violations. For example, a research found that attackers could exploit Joylink protocol 
(shown in Fig.2) due to the lack of authentication [18]. 
Researchers have made several suggestions in order to tackle security issues related to the 
diverseness and heterogeneity of IoT devices deployed in a system by analyzing statically or 
dynamically the device’s firmware. However, the proposed solutions have plausible drawbacks. 
Zaddach et al. [19] presented a framework called Avatar that enables dynamic analysis of 
embedded devices; the framework however needs to forward actions from emulator to device by 
physical connection and thus is not suitable for larger firmware analysis [12]. Another evaluation 
using the presented FIRMADYNE, an automated dynamic analysis system, by Chen et al. [20] 
aimed at larger scale firmware analysis. This led to the discovery of multiple and in some occasions 
previously undiscovered security vulnerabilities. However, in the case of FIRMADYNE the 
drawback is that the analysis is feasible only in Linux based systems. 
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The number of security threats related to IoT will increase as the combination of limited physical 
capabilities mentioned above and the diversity of the interconnected devices increases [21]. 
Several domains such as healthcare utilize mobile IoT devices; thus, it is clearly important that 
strategies of implementing security solutions adapt to the diverse standards, settings and protocols 











3. Authentication and Identity Management 
 
One of the major system requirements related to IoT systems is authentication and Identity 
Management. In case of a malicious party pretending to be an authorized user the confidentiality 
and availability of the system could be at risk, as the attacker can view, delete, modify and 
generally compromise sensitive data. One of the most common practices of authentication is the 
use of a password and username. The use of a single password for all devices in the IoT system is 
less resource intensive but it creates a risk of a more vulnerable system since if the password is 
17 
 
compromised the attacker has access to all interconnected devices [22]. Furthermore, additional 
authentication methods have seen an increase in usage such as biometric authentication, digital 
certificates and keys. 
Identity management includes services and tools used to authenticate an entity that utilizes 
resources of the IoT system. The authentication of an entity relates more to the assurance of its 
genuineness rather than its identity [23]. Identity Management systems are relatively complex to 
implement and they require relatively homogenous systems in order to be applied. Thus, IoT 
systems and their increased diversity in devices, protocols etc., as well as the number of applicable 
domains (plethora of enterprises with different naming policies, protocols and security 
frameworks) present a major challenge in the appliance of IdM [5] [23]. 
 
 
4. Authorization and access control 
 
The plethora and diverseness of the interconnected devices in an IoT system present the risk of a 
malicious party taking control or “inserting” their own devices in the system in order to 
utilize/consume resources. Thus, access control is a major consideration when it comes to IoT 
security as it prevents unauthorized access to the system’s resources. Classic access control models 
include RBAC (role-based access control), ABAC (attribute-based access control) and CapBAC 
(capability-based access control) [24]. 
In RBAC the model revolves around roles such as “administrator” and “guest”. Based on the rights 
that roles have, they can perform or have limitations on certain actions such as write, read and 
execute. ABAC focuses on policies that combine specific characteristics related to the several 
objects, subjects and environment of the system. The policies then based on those characteristics 
create a set of rules according to which different rights are given to users of the system [24]. In the 
CapBAC the entity required to present its authorization capability is the subject (or user) often 
with the use of a token (key and a ticket); this is the main difference between CapBAC and 
traditional ACL systems where in the latter ones the main entity or service provider needs to check 
the authorization levels of the user in order for a requested operation to be performed on the 














With the constant increase of the IoT devices’ complexity, the need for human interaction and 
intervention in order for communication to be established has decreased. IoT devices differ from 
traditional communication between laptops or smartphones. Instead, they can interact with each 
other based on the behavior of the devices and conditions that have been set by users through the 
Internet. For example, a thermometer can detect that temperature has fallen below the threshold 
defined by the set conditions, and thus enable the heating system of the smart house. 
The interdependence of IoT devices creates however a wider range of security vulnerabilities by 
increasing the amount of access point for an attacker. While the device itself can be hard to be 
manipulated, the malicious party can attack and manipulate the behavior of other environmental 
factors in order to create a security breach. Therefore, by using the feature of interdependence the 
attacker can perform an indirect attack to the system. An example can be the scenario of a 
thermometer which after temperature exceeds a specific value, it checks if the air conditioner is on 
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and if not the windows of the apartment automatically open. As shown in Figure 4 a malicious 
party can attack the power supply of the air conditioner in order to set it in “off” state, thus raising 












The security issues caused by interdependence are overlooked as most of the research done aims 
to protect the device itself. Furthermore, it is difficult to design access and privilege management 
for the interdependent devices. Therefore, one of the most common problems related to 
interdependence is that of “over privilege” where devices gain more permissions that are actually 
needed [12]. There have been several suggested solutions such as the proposition of Tianlong Yu 
et al. [26] for new policies and rules in order detect abnormal behavior and sketch a roadmap 
detecting challenges and plausible solutions. However, creating more rules leads to increased 
complexity especially considering the increasing amount of IoT devices. 
Another proposed solution by Jie et al. [27] is ContexIoT, which is a context-based permission 
system for IoT systems aiming to help users perform efficient access control. Furthermore, it 
supports fine-grained context identification and context information prompting at runtime. Thus, 
allows the user to decide whether to allow or deny a specific behavior based on recorded 
information. Two main challenges accompany the abovementioned solution. The first one refers 
to the availability of context as in the majority of cases, after the initial setup procedure of the app 
the user is not involved or interacting with the app at runtime (majority of sensitive permission 
requests occur when user is not interacting with the app). Secondly the number of prompts is 
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another important aspect that should be taken into consideration; the amount of permission 




6. Security issues in smart homes 
 
IoT technology has impacted private homes and is increasingly being applied in order to create 
“smart” homes. Smart homes aim to provide enhanced security, power efficiency and comfort 
through interconnected devices and ease of use. Thus, smart home applications related to IoT 
technology has attracted interest from different domains such as home security providers and the 
energy industry [28]. Smart homes allow residents to remotely access smart devices and appliances 
and use them in order to automate a plethora of actions [29]. 









The system depicted in the Figure 5 can be divided into two layers where the first includes all the 
user end points such as router, computers, tablets and phones. Those devices are used as controllers 
in order to remotely perform certain action such as turning off the light, washing machine etc. 
Before those actions can be completed, they need to pass through the lower layer of the system. 
The lower layer includes the smart central controller, the switch modules, environmental modules, 
RF modules, adjusting modules etc. The main part of the lower layer is the smart central controller 
which connects the two layers in order for the abovementioned user’s actions to be performed. 
The abovementioned system offers specific advantages. The modules (switch, RF etc.) are 
manufactured so that their size is convenient and easily mountable in e.g. walls. Furthermore, the 
utilization of a Wireless sensor network eliminates the need for extra wiring thus making it 
extremely adjustable as to the positioning of the required devices. Consequently, the smart home 
system is easy to install and maintain [30]. 
The increasing number of interconnected devices related to a smart home system subsequently 
increases the potential weak links or entry points of a performed attack, thus increasing security 
risks. Some major security risks are compromised confidentiality and privacy of the smart 
homeowner. A plethora of devices is susceptible to an attack and can potentially become entry 
points for the attacker and those include cameras, printers, home routers etc. The main danger is 
the combinations of all compromised devices in order to create a botnet that can have a wider 
impact [5]. 
A good example of an attack targeting an internet-connected control system was the attack on 
Target’s payment and security systems. The malicious party deployed malware in order to steal 
sensitive data including credit card information used at the stores. The attackers gained access to 
the systems when they took advantage of a weak link between Target and Fazio Mechanical 
Services which was a contractor running Target’s climate systems. Target provided credentials to 
Fazio but did not ensure that the latter one was not able to access the payment system. The 














3 Security in smart toys 
 
Toys defined as an item used in order to play, have existed throughout ancient civilizations until 
the modern era. They have been a part of societies in order to educate, socialize and entertain. Toys 
become especially important in the proper development of a child’s character, as it enables them 
to be creative and develop skills critical for them later in life. Thus, one of the main target groups 
for toy manufacturers throughout the years have been children. 
Toys started from simple wooden sticks and stones and developed to teddy bears and dolls that 
can be interactive, process language and communicate. In a modern era where the goal of the 
majority of electronic devices is to offer a broader approach in connectivity (with IoT being a good 
example) while offering the means to do that conveniently, it comes with no surprise that toys start 
following the same path. Thus, toy manufactures started producing smart toys, a subset of IoT 
devices, which usually offer extreme interactivity. More specifically they often come equipped 
with some sort of sensors and are equipped with electronic parts that allow them to connect in a 
network. Usually, a mobile device is also required in combination with a mobile application in 
order to enable interaction with the smart toy. The connection happens in the majority of cases 
through a Bluetooth connection between the mobile phone and the smart toy. The collected data 
is then exchanged usually through a Wi-Fi connection and stored in the cloud. Moreover, smart 
toys can be equipped with a microphone or even a camera in order to further scan and provide 
additional data processing. 
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3.1 Identifying security risks related to smart toys 
 
As technology changes the way children interact with smart toys during their playtime it creates 
certain advantages such as an enhanced method of improving their problem-solving skills through 
a two-way communication between them and the toy. Moreover, smart toys offer a far more 
personalized experience compared to conventional toys, while occasionally utilizing technological 
fields that are nowadays becoming dominant in people’s everyday lives such as AI and machine 
learning. 
Combining technology with toys consequentially can raise security concerns as well. Utilizing 
new ways of communication and interactivity increases the spectrum of vulnerabilities and makes 
the need for protecting data and ensuring that the privacy of the child remains intact an even more 
crucial task. One the first steps required in order to correctly identify the security issues that can 
arise from the use of a smart toy, is to identify its capabilities and available equipped means with 
which it can achieve those (e.g. equipped microphone, camera etc.). A smart toy that is for example 
capable of recording sound through a microphone and playing it back, can be susceptible to audio 
injection attacks, where an attacker can intercept and decrypt the traffic or even inject and make 
the toy play audio of his choice [32]. Furthermore, we need to also identify the way the different 
components surrounding the physical device (smart toy), such as the mobile app and the servers 
in which data are stored, communicate with each other. 
In most cases, it is common that smart toys access a Wi-Fi network with the help of a mobile 
device and the correspondent app. The mobile device connects to the Wi-Fi access point and 
through the application the necessary network information is transmitted to the IoT device. A 
possible security issue can arise when in certain cases encryption during transmission is not 
available. This can lead to a “neighbor” eavesdropping on the traffic and getting access to sensitive 
data such as the network password. Other devices will attempt to use a different approach and 
transmit the network password over an encrypted connection with the help of cryptographic 
protocols such as the TLS. In certain cases, the smart-toy will receive a SSID and a password over 
a specific port and at this point a security issue can arise where a possible attacker can create an 
access point with the necessary name in order to trick the device and connect to the unsecure 









Figure 6. User interacts with the smart toy which communicates with the help of a mobile device. 




Data leakage is considered one of the main concerns when examining security vulnerabilities in 
smart toys. The issue becomes larger when one considers the amount of sensitive data and personal 
information (such as age, sex and even location) collected and transmitted by the devices [33]. 
Especially considering the target group of those devices which is mainly children; a highly 
sensitive target group. 
Smart toys can be divided into two main categories. The first one includes devices that children 
can directly interact with (an example of this category can be the Hello Barbie doll which can 
respond to the child, thus offering and increased amount of interaction). The second category 
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includes cases when the device is used as a mean of communication (for example a smart walkie- 
talkie, children use to communicate with their parents). Furthermore, those devices utilize two 
architectural categories in order to function which include IoT to Cloud and IoT to App through 
Cloud. 
In the first category the data processing is being done in the cloud backend servers, while another 
requirement is that the smart device is connected to a network with Internet access. In this case the 
child does not need to have access to a mobile device but rather physically interact with the smart 
toy (by pressing for example a button and then proceed on speaking in the microphone). The 
second category involves a mobile app which is connected with the toy through a network with 
Internet access. In this case children can for example use the smart toy to send a voice message to 
their parents’ mobile device, enabling communication between two different parties. In the first 
category an attacker can intercept traffic between the smart toy and the cloud (Figure 7.a) while in 
the second category an attacker can intercept traffic either between the smart toy and the cloud or 





Figure 7. In (a) the malicious party attacks during the data exchange between the 
device and the cloud, while in (b) the attacker can act between the device and the 





Generally, we can identify and categorize security risks related to three main categories of the type 
of access an attacker can have to the smart toy. Physical access, where an attacker needs to have 
the smart toy or the mobile device with the companion app in his possession, nearby access where 
the attacker needs to be into close proximity to the smart toy and finally remote access where 
distance between the attacker and the smart device is irrelevant [34]. 
In the first category where the attacker has a direct physical access to the smart toy, we can identify 
a security vulnerability where a malicious party can configure the smart device in order to forward 
personal data into his account. In the second category where an attacker is in a relatively close 
distance to the smart toy when can identify several vulnerabilities that can lead to data leak. These 
include remote unauthorized control of the smart device as well as connecting to the hotspot of the 
toy in cases where there is no encryption in place. In the latter case a malicious person can even 
utilize a Man in the middle attack and sniff credentials or personal information that are being 
communicated in plaintext. Another issue can arise with smart toys that utilize Bluetooth in order 
to transmit data and particularly with those that make use of static MAC addresses since they are 
susceptible to persistent tracking as well as Man in the middle attacks. 
In the last category of remote access there is a plethora of vulnerabilities that can lead to the 
attacker utilizing remote attacks in order to obtain private information. Firstly, there is password 
brute force attacks whereas an app that requires login and has unlimited number of tries can be 
susceptible to those. Another issue that must be considered is exposure of data to third parties, 
something that can increase the chance of personal data leakage if their security measures are 
inefficient or inadequate. Other vulnerabilities include insecure cookies (for example that do not 
expire) or Insecure TLS practices [34]. 
Finally, according to the STRIDE model, threats can be classified to specific categories depending 
on their type. The STRIDE model stands for Spoofing identity, Tampering with data, 
Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege and it can 
provide an easy and comprehensible way to identify and categorize threats [35]. Below the 






Spoofing • Attacker assumes identity of the child 
when using the device 
• Attacker uses another device to 
control the smart toy 
• Mobile service provider is fake 
Tampering • Altering the configuration file in the 
mobile device 
• Altering data in the database 
• Altering the information transmitted 
through the device and the smart toy 
 Repudiation • User is not notified when an attacker 
uses purchase services 
Information disclosure • Leakage of data stored in the database 
• Leakage of data required to use 
mobile services e.g. Location 
• Leakage of data stored in the mobile 
device e.g. photos 
DoS (Denial of Service) • Attacker sends data to the database in 
order for it to reach full capacity 
• Smart-toy receives commands from 
more than one device simultaneously 
thus not being able to identify the real 
one and provide a correct answer 
• Access point which is utilized by the 
mobile services is shut down 
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Elevation of privilege • Attacker eavesdrop to the data 
exchanged between the smart toy and 
the mobile device and alters it in order 
to gain access 
• Attacker eavesdrop to the data 
exchanged between the mobile device 
and the mobile app and alters it in 
order to gain access 
 
Table 2. STRIDE model classification regarding threats performed on smart toys [2] 
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3.2 Assessment of vulnerabilities’ impact and plausibility 
 
A research made by Gordon Chu, Noah Apthorpe, and Nick Feamster [4] on three smart toys 
revealed several vulnerabilities, some of them not being patched for a considerable amount of time. 
It can then be apparent that vulnerabilities and security issues are indeed a realistic threat which 
leads to the need of raising (especially) parents’ security awareness. 
Lack of encryption and authentication is a common cause for security vulnerabilities on smart toys. 
An example derived from the abovementioned research where a hydration tracker (a smart device 
which tracks the daily water consumption) is investigated and HTTP requests (POST and GET) 
are unencrypted. A malicious party could eavesdrop on the exchange of information between the 
mobile app and the cloud servers and obtain private information (GET request to obtain the profile 
pic of the mobile app user) or even spoof a response that would contain random data in order to 
trigger the remote execution of a piece of code [4]. 
A second example is the smart pet which has more than ten thousand installs on android. It is 
observed again that there are Java files with source code containing constant variables in cleartext. 
Furthermore, there is use of unencrypted GET requests in order to obtain needed XML files, 
something that could lead to interception of those files and maliciously altered with a chance of 
remote code execution [4]. A conclusion that can be draw here is a repeated pattern of unencrypted 
requests or storage of information (in the above example the requests should have been made in 





Figure 8. Malicious party utilizes unencrypted GET and POST http requests in order to communicate 
with the mobile application or the servers. [4] 
 
 
We can observe that attacks on smart toys is an increasingly discussed topic and one of the main 
reasons is the companies’ failure to implement the required measures in order to mitigate dangers 
related to leak of information, especially considering the sensitive consumer group most of those 
devices are targeting to. Because of this the impact of security breaches related to smart toys can 
cause serious concern. One of the reasons is that children generally don’t have an increased 
awareness of what kind of information they share with the smart toy and how the information is 
recorded, something that is enhanced by the fact that a child can form a strong connection of trust 
with the toy [36]. Furthermore, potential leak of the child’s location can put the child to physical 
danger as it can be possible that a child predator can obtain the information and track the location 
potentially trying to harm the child. 
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Similar security issues have been found in another research by Johann-Sebastian Pleban, Ricardo 
Band, Reiner Creutzburg [37] which examined the AR.Drone 2.0 quadcopter. After the toy boots 
up an insecure, unencrypted WIFI hotspot is established in which a malicious attacker can connect 
and perform a port scan revealing a connection to the FTP service as well as Telnet. In both cases 
there is lack of authorization measures in place which can lead to the attacker tampering with the 
configuration files or even injecting malicious files to the drone. Similarly, to the cases mentioned 
above, the smartphone app accompanying the toy offers more “opportunities” for malicious actions 
to the attacker as it can be vulnerable to eavesdropping and thus the attacker gaining access to e.g., 
video stream [37]. As before we can observe that using an encrypted WIFI hotspot instead of an 
unencrypted one could lead to a far more robust and secure infrastructure. 
Security vulnerabilities related to smart toys are something common; as seen in the research paper 
by Sharon Shasha et al., the majority of the IoT devices currently on the market which are 
intended for younger ages have shown to be susceptible to attacks conducted either physically or 
remotely [34]. Furthermore, most of the tested devices are also gathering personal information 
which proceeded to communicate with several ads as well as analytics servers. Surprisingly, the 
gathering of personal identifying information was more intense when targeting younger 
audiences and children as one would expect that security measures would be more well thought 
in such vulnerable target groups. Additionally, the authors analyzed eleven smart devices of 
which nine were vulnerable to some form of attack depending on the access type: physical 
access, nearby point or remote access. The below table presents the percentage of plausible attacks 





Percentage of smart toys 
being susceptible 
Type of access 
Insecure-Bluetooth-practice 54 % Nearby 
Unauthorized-config-physical 36 % Physical 
Unencrypted-comm-channels 36 % Remote 
URL-redirect 36 % Remote 
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No-local personal identifiable 
information protection 
27 % Physical 
Unauthorized-use 27 % Nearby 
Online-password-brute force 27 % Remote 
Insecure-session-cookies 27 % Remote 
Unauthorized-config-nearby 18 % Nearby 
Always-on 18 % Nearby 
Exposure-to-third-parties 18 % Remote 
Insecure-TLS-practices 18 % Remote 















Table 3. Percentage of susceptible smart toys to vulnerabilities depending on their type of access 
required (Adapted from [34]) 
 
It can be observed that one of the most frequent weaknesses when it comes to security and smart 
toys is insecure Bluetooth implementation in development. Specifically, all the toys examined [34] 
were utilizing a static MAC address making the toy and the user (which plausibly is a child) 
trackable. Furthermore, certain toys accept unauthorized incoming Bluetooth connections which 
could lead to attacker connecting to the toy and altering its behavior. Implementing Bluetooth Low 
Energy could potentially help manufacturers solve the abovementioned issues through MAC 
address randomization and whitelisting. 
A significant amount of high-profile attacks on smart toys shows that security attacks are indeed 
feasible and measures against them have been, in many cases, lacking and not given the necessary 
attention by the manufacturing companies. One such case took place in 2015 when the Hong Kong 
based toy manufacturer VTech reported that over 10 million accounts were compromised as 
the database of their online store related to their toys was breached. This resulted in a vast 
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amount of personal information leaking such as names, email addresses, secret questions as well 
as the answers to them, user download history etc. Another report claimed that also photographs 
of younger users were leaked as well as chat logs. The attack was performed through a SQL 
injection. While VTech reported that images and audio files were encrypted with the AES 
algorithm the decryption keys on the other hand were lacking the necessary security measures 
[3]. 
Another case that indicates the necessity for manufacturing companies in putting more effort in 
securing not only the physical devices themselves but also their own services related to them is the 
Hello Kitty breach. The information of over three million accounts was leaked, including names, 
gender, age, emails and country of origin. The cause of the breach was a misconfiguration during 
the installation of the MongoDB database [3]. Breaches like the one in the Hello Kitty case should 
be quite alarming as identity theft is a serious issue when related to adults; even more so when 
the hacked accounts possibly include children as well. While Sanrio, the creator of Hello Kitty 
toys, initially declined that data was actually stolen, in the last statement admitted that the leaked 
data looked real and there has been indeed a major incident of data theft cause by the MongoDB 
misconfiguration. 
There are several reasons that smart toy manufacturers neglect maintaining and enhancing the 
security measures of the device. One of the main reasons seem to be the limited budget of the 
manufacturers. Unfortunately, while trying to maximize profit companies that create IoT devices 
for children do not invest enough in the enhancement of the security measures. In the 
abovementioned case of VTech, the manufacturer was using an algorithm in order to hash 
passwords (MD5) which was already deemed obsolete due to increased computing power of 
available devices in the market since the hashing algorithm was first introduced [38]. Another 
factor that could lead to smart toys lacking the necessary security infrastructure is the 
manufacturer's lack of capable personnel which can lead to software bugs, security holes. Finally, 
lack of motivation and focusing on implementing smart toy features as fast as possible in order to 
be “pushed” to production (in an attempt to maximize profit), while neglecting the security aspect 
of the IoT device is another factor. 
Even after an incident of a security breach is revealed, smart toy manufacturers fail to make serious 
attempt in order to strengthen security measures against malicious attacks. In the case of VTech 
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for example, after the breach in their database, the manufacturer did not make any serious attempts 
in fixing the issues. Instead they revised the terms and conditions of the user agreement in order 
to abdicate responsibility and indicate that fault lies with the parents in case of a future data leak 
[38]. 
Another example of smart-toy manufacturers acting with irresponsibility towards consumers is 
presented in the research paper of Gordon Chu, Noah Apthorpe, and Nick Feamster where several 
devices violate the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). In the first case the 
presented hydro-tracker violates COPPA due to the possibility of the profile picture mining attack. 
As the consumer target group is likely children, the pictures are likely to be mostly of children 
which indicates that there are no adequate measures to protect the privacy and personal information 
of children. Also, personal information should be released to providers and third parties which 
have taken necessary steps to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the data. Furthermore, 
when a new profile picture is set, the URL directing to the old one is still valid and working, 
something which violates the data retention policy of COPPA [4]. 
As shown above while manufacturers state that their privacy policy and implementation offer 
strong security and data protection, often their promises fall short. The hydration tracker is one 
such example but there is a plethora of other smart toys in the market with the same pattern; strong 
privacy policies that fail during the implementation phase. This is enforced especially with cases 
such as a smart toy using an encryption algorithm in order to protect voice data of children while 
at the same time using a fixed set of keys which makes decryption of data in transit between the 
device and the server plausible. Consequentially, there have been legal actions taken against toy 
manufacturers such as VTech. Thus, it is important that researchers continue to analyze and test 
the security level of smart toys as well as provide information when security vulnerabilities are 
discovered to the responsible actors [4]. 
There have been several researchers trying to identify the requirements that can be set to smart toy 
manufacturers, in order to comply with data and privacy protection regulations such as GDPR 
which has been set by the European Union Council. The requirement set can be identified based 
on e.g. Microsoft SDL (security software development) during the first two main phases of 
requirements and design [2]. It can be observed that the requirements can be grouped into specific 
categories based on their context. The category of “integrity” can include requirements that relate 
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to the identification and statement of the reasons for specific actions from the manufacturers' side 
which target the customer side (e.g. reasons for collecting personal data). More specifically, this 
category can include requirements such as the manufacturers’ obligation to state which 
information they collect as well as its use and methods of collection. Furthermore, included in the 
contextual category of “integrity” are the requirements of acquiring parental consent before 
attempting to collect and process sensitive data, as well as notifying the consumers in case of a 
data breach or leak. Finally, another example of a contextual category can be that of “clarity” 
which relates to the ways the abovementioned actions are handled and processed. An example 
falling under this category is the obligation of manufacturers to inquire for parental consent in a 
clear, transparent and intelligent form. Below the full table of contextual categories and associated 







Contextual Category Requirement 
Integrity • State and identify the collected 
information 
• Acquire parental consent before 
attempting to collect and process 
sensitive data 
• Notify customers in the case of a data 
breach 
• Specify the type of the collected 
information 
• Acquire individual consent for 
collected data 
• Cease processing of information to 
third parties when data is erased 
Clarity • Asking for consent in an intelligent 
and transparent form 
• Document clearly and consistently the 
reason for collecting the necessary 
data 
Consistency • Same level of protection for data 
processed by third parties 




 • Only store and process required 
information as long as necessary 
• Always keep personal information up 
to date and accurate as necessary 
Efficiency • Protect data’s availability, 
confidentiality and integrity 
• Design procedure and actions to 
protect the collected data 
• Implement measures against theft or 
loss, unauthorized access and 
modification 
• Measures have to be designed from 
the beginning of the system’s lifecycle 

















4 Evaluation of a commercially available smart 
toy 
4.1 Method and used tools 
 
For the purpose of the case study, I evaluated the potential security risks of a commercially 
available fitness band (Willful), whose target consumers include children and teenagers. The 
device is also accompanied by the relevant mobile application. The evaluation approach consists 
of a static and dynamical analysis in order to identify security vulnerabilities. 
The evaluation process utilized tools used in penetration testing, malware analysis, security 
assessment etc., in order to perform the static analysis. Furthermore, for the dynamic analysis, a 
Raspberry Pi 3 Model A+ was used in order to create a Wi-Fi access point. After the Wi-Fi access 
point is created, a mobile phone device with the smart toy’s relevant application installed, is 
connected to the access point. In order to observe the flow of web traffic an open-source proxy- 
software was used called “mitmproxy” [39]. The traffic was observed with a laptop connected to 






Figure 9. Setup used for dynamic analysis 
 
 
In order to perform a static analysis Kali Linux running on VMware was used. Furthermore the 
apk of the smart device’s relevant mobile application was obtained from https://apkpure.com/ and 
its analysis was achieved through MobSF [40]. 
 
 
4.2 Static Analysis 
 
In order to create a static analysis on the APK of the mobile application, Kali Linux was used as 
the selected operating system. The OS was run in a created virtual machine on Windows 10 with 
the usage of VMWare. Furthermore, after the creation of the virtual machine and the necessary 
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operating system’s updates, MobSF was used in order to analyze the apk and obtain critical 
information about the mobile application. 
 
 
4.2.1 Mobile Security Framework 
 
Mobile Security Framework is a tool used in order to perform penetration testing in mobile 
applications, malware analysis and it is capable of performing both static and dynamic analysis. In 
this case study MobSF was used mainly in order to perform static analysis on the relevant mobile 
application as dynamic analysis required running MobSF outside of a virtual machine. The pre- 
requirements for MobSF in the Kali Linux operating systems is: 
1. Installation of git 
2. Installed version of Python v3.7 
3. Installed JDK 8+ 
4. Installation of relevant dependencies as stated in the documentation [41] 
 
Moreover, for the installation of MobSF on a Linux based system the following commands need 
to be executed on the terminal (clone from github, navigate to the directory of MobSF, and run 
setup.sh): 
 
Lastly in order to run MobSF we execute ./run.sh 127.0.0.1:8000 and in a browser of our choice 




4.2.2 Static report 
 
Firstly, the application is signed with v1 signature scheme, which can be a potential security risk 
especially on Android versions older than version 7.0 due to the Janus vulnerability. The attackers 
can modify the code of applications by adding extra bytes without altering the signature which 
leads to the Android runtime accepting the malicious code as legitimate update of the affected 
application [42]. 
Furthermore, the application requires multiple permissions, many of them are considered 
dangerous and can lead to potential security issues. Some of the permissions required are the 
following: 
 
PERMISSION INFO DESCRIPTION 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Coarse(network-based) 
location 
Access coarse location 
sources, such as the mobile 
network database, to 
determine an approximate 
phone location where 
available. Malicious 
applications can use this to 
determine approximately 
where the use is located. 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION GPS location Access fine location sources 
such as GPS on the mobile 
device, where available. 
ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS Phone calls Allows the application to 
answer an incoming phone 
call. 
BLUETOOTH Create Bluetooth 
connections 
Allows an application to view 
the configuration of Bluetooth 
on   the   device   as   well   as 
creating       and       accepting 
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  connections with paired 
devices. 
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN Bluetooth administration Allows the application to 
configure the local Bluetooth 
and pair it with remote 
devices. 
CALL_PHONE Directly call phone 
numbers 
Allows the application to call 
phone numbers without user 
intervention. Malicious 
application may cause 
unexpected call charges. The 
permission does not allow the 
application to call emergency 
numbers. 
CAMERA Take pictures and videos Allows the application to take 
pictures and videos with the 
camera. This allows the 
application to collect images 
that the camera is seeing at 
any time 
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Change Wi-Fi status Allows an application to 
connect and disconnect from 
Wi-Fi access points and to 
make changes to configures 
Wi-Fi networks. 
GET_TASKS Retrieve running 
applications 
Allows the application to 
retrieve information about 
currently running (or recently 
run)        tasks.        Malicious 
application     may    discover 
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  private information about 
other applications. 
INTERNET Full Internet access Allows the application to 
create network sockets 
READ_CONTACTS Read contact data Allows an application to read 
all of the contact data stored in 
the mobile device. 
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Read SD card contents Allows the application to read 
from SD card 
READ_PHONE_STATE Read phone state and 
identity 
Allows the application to 
access the phone features of 
the device. An application 
with this permission can 
determine the phone number 
and serial number of the 
phone, whether a call is active, 
the number that call I 
connected to etc. 
READ_SMS Read SMS Allows the application to read 
SMS messages stored in the 
mobile device or SIM card. A 
malicious   application    may 
read confidential information 
RECEIVE_SMS Receive SMS Allows the app to receive and 
process SMS messages. 
Malicious applications may 
monitor your messages or 






Allows an application to 
request   installing   packages. 
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  Malicious applications can 
use this to try and trick users 
into installing additional 
malicious packages. 
WRITE_CONTACTS Write contact data Allows the application to 
modify addresses stored on 
the mobile device. Malicious 
applications can use this to 
erase or modify contact data. 
com.google.android.providers.gsf. 
permission.READ_GSERVICES 
Google maps permission This permission is related to 
the google maps API and 
allows the application to 
modify the google service 
map. However, the permission 
is not required anymore in 
order to use the Google Maps 
API. 
Table 5. Sample of application’s required permissions 
 
 
Apart from the aforementioned permissions, the Android manifest analysis also reveals certain 
security risks some of them categorized as highly severe: 
• Launch        Mode         of         several         activities         (.module.home.MainActivity, 
.module.me.FeedbackActivity etc) is not standard. An Activity should not have the launch 
mode attributes set to “singleTask/singleInstance” as it becomes root Activity and it is 
possible for other applications to read the contents of the calling intent. Using the 
“standard” launch mode attribute is recommended. 
• Several activities (com.mob.tools.MobUIShell, .module.home.WXEntryActivity etc) are not 
protected. The activity is found to be shared with other application on the device therefore 
leaving it accessible to any other app on the mobile device. 
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• Service (.common.location.LocationService) is not protected as it is found to be shared 
with other apps on the device, thus leaving it accessible to any other application on the 
mobile device. 
• Certain Services such as .second.ui.services.IntelligentNotificationService is protected by 
a permission, but the protection level of permission should be checked. The permission for 
the service is android.permisson.BIND_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SERVICE. 
The service is protected by the permission which is not defined in the analyzed application. 
Consecutively the protection level of the permission should be checked since in the case it 
is set in e.g. normal, a malicious application can request and obtain permission to interact 
with the component. If the permission is set to signature, only application signed with the 
same certificate can obtain the permission. 
 
 
In addition to the Android manifest, analyzing the code of the application shows security risks 
some of the being severe in terms of importance. Firstly, the application uses SQLite Database and 
executes raw SQL queries. A malicious party can utilize this by inserting data to a raw SQL query 
which can cause an SQL injection. Furthermore, all sensitive information should be encrypted 
before written to the database. 
Moreover, certain information is exposed (e.g. IP address) as it is included as plain text in the code 
of the application. The application can also read and write to an external storage which can present 
a security risk of another application reading the data which is written to the external storage. 








The naming does not reveal further information but generally sensitive data (it is probable that the 
.png file is the photograph of the user) should not be written in a temp file. It is also worth 
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mentioning that the application uses the MD5 hash function in order to encrypt specific data such 
as the username. MD5 has been known to be a weak hash function that has severe design flaws 
and hash collisions where given two different messages the final MD5 hash can be identical [43]. 
Additionally, in some instances the application uses the statistical pseudo-random number 
generator (java.util.Random) while it is recommended to use e.g. Java’s SecureRandom class in 
order to generate a cryptographical secure number. 
The application implements WebView insecurely since the execution of user-controlled code in 
WebView is a critical security hole. Usually developers use WebView to display secure websites, 
but in the case a user navigates to an untrusted malicious website, sensitive data can potentially be 
exposed. In addition, if the application loads an HTTP page and it is connected in an insecure Wi- 
Fi access point, it will be susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack where malicious data can be 
inserted into the page [44]. 
 











Another issue related to the how WebView is implemented in the application’s code is that 
WebView ignores SSL Certificate errors and accepts any SSL Certificate something that can make 
it susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack [45]. 
Furthermore, the application uses ECB mode where every block is encrypted independently and 
thus making it possible to process in a parallel way. ECB mode has significant drawbacks and 
presents a security risk. The fact that blocks are encrypted individually without relying on each 
other creates a security issue where a malicious party can hijack a block and replace a legitimate 
block with it without being detected. The aforementioned issue is called the block independency 
problem. Another issue with ECB mode is the fact that it results in identical ciphertext for identical 
blocks of plaintext [47]. 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that the application uses a Clipboard Manager in order to copy 
data to the clipboard. It is not clear from the source code if the string that is copied contains 
sensitive data but generally is it inadvisable that private or sensitive information is copied to the 
clipboard as other applications can have access to it. 
The performed APKiD analysis checks the available classes.dex files in order to identify code that 
could potentially indicate the presence of techniques similarly used by malware software (e.g. 
Anti-VM Code or Anti Debug Code). Malware authors can potentially use the aforementioned 
techniques in order to make the process of discovering malicious code difficult. The Anti-VM 
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techniques are utilized in order to identify whether the code is being run in a Virtual Environment 
(as most security analysts prefer to run the analysis inside a virtual machine) and consequentially 
complicate the analysis. On the other hand, the Anti-Debug techniques are used in order to detect 
if the malicious code is being debugged and thus slow down the process. The findings are presented 










Possible Build.SERIAL check 
Network operator name check 
Subscriber ID check 












Possible Build.SERIAL check 
Subscriber ID check 







  Possible Build.SERIAL check 
Build.TAGS check 
SIM operator check 
Network operator name check 
Subscriber ID check 
Possible ro.secure check 
Emulator file check 
lib/arm64-v8a/libJni_wgs2gcj.so 
lib/armeabi/libJni_wgs2gcj.so 
Obfuscator Obfuscator-LLVM version 3.6.1 
lib/armeabi/libAMapSDK_MAP_ 
v6_9_3.so 
Packer Found Sharelib UPX 




All the domains relevant to the app were checked and are secure as nothing out of the ordinary 
stood out during the analysis. Several emails were also visible, which are assumingly connected 
with test operations as well as used in order to send logged errors etc. Furthermore, the following 










4.3 Dynamic Analysis 
 
Initially an attempt was made to utilize MobSF’s dynamic analysis capabilities. This required 
running MobSF outside a virtual machine while also installing an Android Emulator. For this 
purpose, Genymotion was installed alongside Virtual Box in order to create an android virtual 
environment. During execution of dynamic analysis, I encountered several crashes and errors 
preventing me from obtaining any useful information. Therefore, a different approach was 
preferred (creating a Wi-Fi access point with the utilization of a Raspberry Pi as well as using 
MITM proxy) which is further explained below. 
4.3.1 MITM Proxy 
 
When mentioning Man-In-The-Middle Proxy we refer to a part of software that is running on e.g. 
a Wi-Fi access point or a router and is used as an intermediate between the client, for example a 
mobile device, and the server. By doing so the MITM Proxy can intercept and parse web traffic 
between the two points of the client and the server, as well as modify a certain request and then 
pass it on to the relevant party (client or server). 
In many cases the MITM proxy can be used as a mean of protection and monitoring inside 
networks, e.g. a company’s private network where an MITM proxy can be used in order to avoid 
passing sensitive data to the Internet. 
MITM proxy can be also used in malicious ways in order to help the attacker intercept traffic and 
manipulate it. An example can be any open network (these can still be found in many public places 
e.g. cafeteria) where the attacker has set up the MITM proxy to a created Wi-Fi access point. Thus, 
if a client connects to the access point, the malicious party will be able to intercept and parse traffic 












4.3.2 Setting up MITM Proxy on Raspberry Pi 3 A+ 
 
4.3.2.1 Creation of Wi-Fi access point 
 
The first step in order to set up MITM Proxy was to utilize the Raspberry Pi as a Wi-Fi access 
point in which the phone will be connected, and traffic will be visible. Initially, it is important to 
configure the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). The DHCP is an automation 
mechanism that configures the network interface when it received a dynamical address [49]. 
Another option is to assign a static address to the network interface which is the chosen option in 
this set up. 
Firstly, I configured the Raspberry Pi’s DHCP client configuration in order to assign a static 
address to the wireless network interface (wlan0). This will behave as the Wi-Fi access point’s 
address in which devices can connect. In the case of the DHCP server side, the software is 
responsible for assigning the address to the devices connecting to the above network. 
The following lines are added to the dhcpcd.conf file: 
 
Now the static ip_address is assigned and the wpa_supplicant’s hook is disabled in order to prevent 




Additionally, isc-dhcp-server and hostapd need to be installed. Isc-dhcp-server is used in order to 
assign addresses to the connected devices while hostapd work as an authenticator of devices 
connecting to the access point. In order to install the dhcp-server: 
 
After the installation is complete, the configuration file must be edited, 
 
and authoritative option uncommented. In order to configure the DHCP server to assign addresses 
in the range of 192.168.42.10 to 192.168.42.250 and a broadcast address of 192.168.42.255 we 
need to add the following lines to the DHCP server configuration file: 
 
Additionally, in the DHCP server file the interfacev4 needs to be set as the wireless network 
interface (wlan0) as well as the interfacev6 need to be commented out. 
The next step is the configuration of hostapd .config file where we set the following parameters: 
 
• interface=wlan0 














Now the created Wi-Fi access point should be visible, and devices should be able to connect to it. 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Installation and usage of MITM Proxy 
 
In order to install the MITM Proxy a simple sudo pip install mitmproxy command is used. When 
the installation is complete, we can verify that mitmproxy was correctly installed with: mitmproxy 
--version. 
 
Furthermore, in order to be able to successfully intercept web traffic and let it pass through the 
wired and wireless interfaces, the IP tables’ rules must be modified and saved. The final step in 
the setup is to allow the OS to forward traffic between networks and can be achieved by executing, 
 
 
as well as uncommenting net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 option in the sysctl.conf file in order to allow 
the aforementioned setting to persist when the system is rebooted. 
 
 
4.3.3 Traffic observation and analysis 
 
The set-up is complete, and we can now intercept traffic and observe it through MITM proxy 
something that can be achieved conveniently through its web interface. 
Initially and after starting the fit band's accompanied mobile application, a POST Request is 
created: POST http://(name of the application’s api)/firmware/getLatestV2 HTTP/1.1 
It is easily observed that the POST request is an unencrypted and unauthenticated http Request. 
This remains the case in every request the application and the servers send to each other and 
renders it easy for the attacker to spy and alter traffic between those two points. 
Interestingly the application in the aforementioned initial POST request uses data (such as age and 









After the application obtains the response from the server, it attempts to automatically login with 
a POST http://(name of the application’s api)/user/login HTTP/1.1 
The server’s response contains personal information that a malicious party could intercept 
(personal data which is stored in the server is assumingly used in order to populate the various 









Furthermore, when the mobile application user attempts to change her personal information, the 
POST request http://(name of the application’s api)/user/updateUserInfo HTTP/1.1 is an HTTP 








In the above request the user id token is visible as well. After logging out of the mobile application 
and waiting for a considerable amount of time I attempted to investigate whether the token changes 
or is refreshed (depending either on the session being closed or a specific amount of time has 
passed). This is not the case, as the token remains the same and is reused every time the mobile 
application’s user is attempting to change e.g. account information as shown above. 
This presents a serious security vulnerability since in the instance where the malicious party 
intercepts the user id token, it can use the token in any request sent to the servers and pretend to 
be the legitimate user of the mobile application. Additionally, the user id token seems to be the 
only data the application uses in order to authenticate the logged in user when requests are sent to 
the server. The fact that all requests are unencrypted and unauthenticated HTTP requests, makes 
it easy for the attacker to spoof requests. 
One example is the case where the same request is sent to the server but with the different username 












Additionally, when a user logs into the mobile application the password, as seen in Figure 15, is 
included to the server’s response. Using a hash analyzer, it is identified that the password is 
encrypted with a SHA-1 hash algorithm. 
 






Therefore, the malicious party can create its own password and encrypt it using the SHA-1 hash 
algorithm. Since the user id token is not refreshed a POST request http://(name of the application’s 
api)/user/updatePasswordByUserId HTTP/1.1 can be spoofed and sent to the server in order to 








The server’s respond contains a “successful operation” message indicating that the spoofed request 
was accepted (thus verifying that only the userId is checked upon). Indeed, when trying to login 
into the mobile application the password is changed into the one set by the attacker. Therefore, not 
only does the malicious party gain access to the legitimate user’s account but also prevents the 
user from gaining access into the account. 
Lastly, another observation that can be made is when a 404-server response is received the page is the 
default one which has not been customized accordingly. Therefore, the response includes unnecessary 
























Both the static and dynamic analysis which the case study is consisted of revealed interesting 
results considering the security of the smart device’s accompanied mobile application. It is also 
worth mentioning here that the application has over five million downloads in Google play store 
at the time of writing, hence raising the relevant security issues’ importance even more. 
Furthermore, the smart toy device itself is easily purchasable in major online stores such as e.g. 
Amazon. 
Firstly, there is a plethora of concerns and security issues after performing the static analysis. The 
application is vulnerable to the Janus vulnerability as it is signed with v1 signature scheme and 
this can be avoided by signing the application with a v2 signature scheme. This is only the case in 
newer versions of Android 7.0 and above as older versions are still vulnerable even with a v2 
signature scheme. However, developers should always use the v2 signature scheme. 
Furthermore, the mobile application requires multiple permissions in order to function as intended. 
This is a broader topic of discussion as many mobile applications abuse this by requesting user’s 
permission to access certain functionalities of the mobile device that would be seemingly 
unnecessary to the application. This is called the Permission Abuse Problem [51]. Many of the 
aforementioned permissions can be utilized in order to obtain sensitive data such as contact 
addresses or even the location of the mobile device. One of the most interesting permissions 
which is utilized also by the case study’s investigated mobile application, is android’s 
READ_PHONE_STATE permission. As one of the most abused permissions, it can detect the 
mobile device’s serial number and potentially uncover the owner’s personal ID information [52]. 
Wu et al. [51] propose that a percentage of 77.6% of mobile applications are requesting a larger  
60 
 
number of permissions that are actively needed therefore leading to a Permission Abuse Problem. 
The pitfall of this security issue is more frequently observed in less experienced developers. 
The Andoid manifest analysis indicates several weak security points that could potentially be 
exploited by a malicious party. One of them being the launch mode of several activities. As Ren 
et al. demonstrated a system task has a certain preferred state by the attacker in which it contains 
a mix of malicious activities (from the malware) as well as harmless activities from the potential 
victim’s application. The hijacked state transition occurs when a malware takes over and turns the 
system task into a dangerous one. There are two types of a hijack state transitions as either a 
malicious activity gets pushed into the victim’s task back stack or a benign activity from the 
application gets pushed into the malware’s back stack. The pre-conditions in order for certain 
hijacked state transitions to happen is that the launch mode of the relevant activity is set to 
“singleTask” instead of “standard” [53]. Therefore, it is advisable that developers are cautious 
when setting the launch mode to anything else than the standard mode. 
An additional point that can be mentioned is the best practices that should be used when sharing 
data across multiple applications. The investigated application has several activities and services 
that can be accessed through other applications on the mobile device. Several actions can be made 
in order to enforce security when sharing the application’s data such as explicitly defining the read 
only or write only permissions depending on the relevant occasion and needs. Furthermore, certain 
flags such as e.g. FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION can be utilized in order to 
provide clients a single time access to relevant information and data. Lastly it is recommended to 
use "content://" URIs and not "file://" URIs [54]. 
The application uses the SQLite database while also using raw SQL queries. The source code 
reveals that string concatenation is used in order to construct the SQL queries, something that is 
strongly inadvisable. Including data to the initial query string can present problems ranging from 
bugs and smelly code to severe security risks. The recommended approach in order to avoid the 
aforementioned issues is to utilize parameterization. Instead of including data to the query, it 
includes only characters such as “?” whereas data is passed on as parameters in the same order as 
the special character appears in the query. The advantage of using parameterization when building 
the SQL query is that there is a clear separation between data and SQL syntax [55]. 
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Another topic worth mentioning is WebView as it is an essential feature in Android development. 
Moreover, the static analysis revealed certain security risks related to how WebView is 
implemented in the investigated application. While WebView is one of the most popular tools in 
Android development and it is used extensively in many applications, it is vulnerable in cases 
where user’s actions trigger the execution of the application’s code. This is caused by certain 
features of WebView that are missing and are not supported in applications based on it. Some of 
the aforementioned features that exist in traditional web browsers but not in WebView based 
applications are the address bar which allows the user to be aware about the URL of the page that 
is being loaded as well as several security notifications such as the padlock that informs about the 
status of the page’s security level (as seen in Figure 11) [45]. Furthermore, during the static 
analysis and code review of the application, it is observed that there is an improper SSL handling 
procedure in place, where the app is bypassing SSL certification and ignoring certificate errors. 
Both of those issues can lead to an increased risk of a malicious party performing a Man-in-the- 
Middle attack on the application. 
In order to minimize the risk of an attack it is advisable that certain practices are being followed. 
Firstly, in order to address the lack of security cues that could help indicate to the user whether the 
page rendered is secure or not, Shin et al. [45] suggest using a visual security cue system called 
SSLight (or a similar system to SSLight) which displays cues similar to traffic lights and therefore 
informing the user of the security level of the rendered page. Moreover, another recommended 
security practice is the verification of the content being loaded as well as the evaluation in order 
to ensure that the content is the expected one. This can be performed by overriding the 
shouldOverrideUrlLoading() and the shouldInterceptRequest() methods and checking the domain 
the pages are loaded from [56]. Lastly and more importantly the SSL certificate error handling has 
to be addressed as ignoring error can lead to security holes. The majority of the SSL errors occur 
when the certificate has not been verified, thus leading in to blocking the unauthorized connection. 
Therefore, it is strongly recommended that developers avoid utilizing bypassing techniques or 
generally ignoring SSL errors and instead obtain and install a signed certificate as it is the most 
secure option [56]. 
Aside from the static analysis, the dynamic analysis indicates several security concerns as well. 
The main and most crucial security issue is that communications occur over HTTP as observed 
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from the captured GET and POST requests. Using HTTP makes it considerably easier for an 
attacker to intercept communications between the application and the server. Additionally, the 
requests from the application as well the responses received from the server, often include 
potentially unnecessary personal information and data such as city and country of residence, age, 
weight, height etc. It is extremely inadvisable to use HTTP as instead a secure communication 
protocol such as HTTPS should be preferred and used in all communications. 
Another critical security flaw that was recognized during the dynamic analysis was the fact that 
the token used in order to verify the user is never refreshed as it is assumingly stored and used as 
is without any restrictions or conditions set. This presents with a security issue where if an 
attacking party attempts and succeeds on intercepting the user id token, it can spoof requests sent 
to the server in order to pretend being the legitimate user. As shown in the analysis’ examples the 
attacker can then change the user’s information ranging from trivial information to crucial data 
such as password, email etc. It is important that developers address security flaws like the 
aforementioned one and therefore a recommended solution to the unaltered token is to establish 
necessary mechanisms in order for it to refresh. Some examples can be a time restriction on the 
token so that it is periodically being refreshed depending on the set time interval, or a session 
sensitive token where any time the user logs out of the mobile application the user id token is 
changed. 
Lastly, it is observed that the application seemingly misuses unnecessary information either in 
requests towards the server or as shown in Figure 21 during a 404-error page server response where 
no customization has been made and both the operating system and the server are revealed. It is 
crucial that developers restrict the exposure of unrelated information in order to minimize the 
attack surface a malicious party can use in order to attack the system (e.g. customize the server’s 












6 Conclusion and Future Work 
IoT devices and more specifically Smart Toys have become increasingly popular therefore several 
questions about how well protected smart toys are, have arisen. A plethora of different security 
issues have already been identified and certain recommendations have been suggested in order to 
help developers enforce the security of smart toys. This thesis has analyzed and investigated 
vulnerabilities and potential security risks presented in a smart toy, as well as the similarity and 
correlation between already analyzed devices. 
As shown during the static and dynamic analysis of the smart toy, there are multiple issues that are 
present in a commercial smart device, which can potentially be exploited as well as sensitive 
information be exposed. The inexperience of developers when considering security especially 
related to smart devices is an important factor that contributes to the lack of security awareness. 
Furthermore, smart toys and IoT devices in general have restricted resources and limited 
capabilities which are challenging developers. 
The smart device is commercially available as of May 2021 through e-commerce platforms such 
as Amazon. The investigated smart toy has several security risks that are fundamental in nature. 
Unencrypted requests using HTTP as well as user identification token that is not refreshed 
possibly indicate lack of expertise and inexperience of developers, related to following appropriate 
security practices during code creation. 
In the case presented during the dynamic analysis, we simulated an attacker intercepting the GET 
or POST requests that were transmitted through the mobile application and the server. The 
prerequisite is that the user connects to an insecure Wi-Fi access point where a man-in-the-middle 
attack is being performed. Naturally, the fact that all communications are unencrypted makes it 
easier for the attacker to intercept and benefit from the obtained data. Other methods and 
64 
 
approaches of malicious attacks could be further investigated in the future in order to identify and 
define additional security flaws. 
Furthermore, the investigated smart toy does not have Wi-Fi capabilities and instead 
communicates with the mobile application through a Bluetooth connection. The dynamic and static 
analysis focuses solely on the smart device’s accompanied mobile application. A future topic to 
investigate and explore further can be the investigation of security flaws focused on the Bluetooth 
communication between the smart toy and the mobile application. 
This thesis focuses on analyzing a single smart device and based on the results it is evident that 
security practices are often neglected during a smart device’s development thus it is necessary 
developers increase the priority of enforcing security in smart toys. However, further research is 
required on a variety of smart toys in order to create a concrete view related to smart toys’ security 
infrastructure. Moreover, it would be beneficial to continue investigating the devices after they 
receive an update in order to evaluate and identify improvements to their security level. 
As the number of released smart devices increases, the workload of manually auditing them 
becomes increasingly larger. Therefore, a topic for future work is to create an automated tool that 
will help audit the devices and identify security flaws. While there are available tools that perform 
evaluation of network traffic and source code there is a need for connecting results with a product’s 
privacy policies. Thus, when the automated auditing tool recognizes security issues it can compare 
them with the defined smart toy’s privacy policies and recognize privacy breaches. The 
development of such a tool would be a challenging task as many companies purposefully define 
policies vaguely. As such there is a need to map the privacy policies to valid security properties 
upon which the automated tool can be based and evaluate the related product. 
Conclusively, there is still the need to enforce security protocols in smart toys and in IoT devices 
in general as potentially every smart device can be vulnerable in a variety of attacks. This is 
troublesome especially in the case of smart toys since because of the nature of the devices, the 
potentially leaked information can have a greater impact and implications since it is related to 
children. Therefore, smart toys manufacturers must closely cooperate with security experts and 
supervising parties in order to ensure robust and strict security protocols are being followed. Future 
and continued work and auditing is required in order to ensure the privacy policies of the 
abovementioned products are not breached as well as motivate smart toys manufacturers to 
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